Drug Importation in United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer: Does 21 U.S.C. 952 Really Mean from Any Place Outside the United States by Maiorano, Wayne K.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 22 | Number 2 Article 8
Winter 1997
Drug Importation in United States v. Ramirez-
Ferrer: Does 21 U.S.C. 952 Really Mean from Any
Place Outside the United States
Wayne K. Maiorano
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wayne K. Maiorano, Drug Importation in United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer: Does 21 U.S.C. 952 Really Mean from Any Place Outside the
United States, 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 663 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol22/iss2/8
Drug Importation in United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer: Does 21 U.S.C. 952
Really Mean from Any Place Outside the United States
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol22/iss2/8
Drug Importation in United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer:
Does 21 U.S.C. § 952 Really Mean
From "Any Place Outside" the United States?
I. Introduction
Illegal importation of controlled substances is an ever
increasing problem for the United States in its "war on drugs,"' a
war the United States is losing.2 Every year since 1981 the total
federal funds spent on drug enforcement has increased By 1995,
the nation's drug enforcement budget had risen to 8.3 billion
dollars. Nonetheless, the onslaught of drugs being introduced into
the United States has not slowed Of particular concern are the
tremendous quantities of cocaine imported each year into the
United States, creating a threat to our national security and the
safety of the public at large.6 If the "tide of... cocaine flooding
across our borders" cannot be stopped, all attempts to control the
domestic drug problem are "doomed to failure."7
I See FBI Chief: U.S. Not Winning Drug War, UPI, Mar. 30, 1995 (containing
testimony of FBI Director Louis Freeh before a Congressional crime subcommittee to
outline the United States strategy to fight drugs and violent crime) [hereinafter FBI
ChieA.
2 See id.
3 See Dick Cady, New Crackdown on Drugs Turns Into the Same Old Song Again,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 2, 1995, at COI. In 1986, the President's Commission on
Organized Crime reported that drug trafficking was the single most serious organized
crime problem facing the United States. See id. (citing report released by the President's
Commission on Organized Crime).
4 See id.
5 A by-product of this onslaught has been the increase in drug related cases in
U.S. courts. See Drug Cases: Overloading Federal Justice System, USA TODAY
(MAGAZINE), Dec. 1995, at 6 (discussing the overwhelming increase of drug related
cases on federal court dockets and the resulting increase in prisoner population).
Specifically, the federal justice system is strained to capacity due, in large part, to the
government's ongoing fight against the illegal drug trade. See id. In 1995, the federal
prison system housed over 92,000 drug related offenders, with an additional 10,500
sentenced federal offenders serving out their terms in state and local prisons. See id.
6 See FBI Chief, supra note 1. An estimated 820 metric tons of cocaine and 314
tons of heroin is produced each year, of which at least an eighth of the world's cocaine
production was seized in the United States in 1994. See id.
7 FBI Chief, supra note 1 (quoting Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator
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In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act.8 Section 952 of this act governs the importation
of drugs into the United States.9 Though the meaning of the term
"importation" seems straightforward, it can be disputed in unusual
factual situations. 0  Specifically, if controlled substances
originating in the United States crossed'over non-U.S. territory en
route to a final destination within the United States, it could be
argued that, because of their domestic origin, they were not
imported into the United States. Another plausible interpretation
is that, because the substances last traveled through non-U.S.
international waters before arriving in the United States, they were
imported. It was this issue that the First Circuit faced in United
States v. Ramirez-Ferrer."
In Ramirez-Ferrer, the First Circuit held that when controlled
substances were transported from a municipality in Puerto Rico
(within U.S. territory), through international waters, to the same
municipality (again in U.S. territory), they were not "imported"
and therefore did not violate § 952(a)." The First Circuit's
holding and its analysis of the issue stand in sharp contrast to
previous decisions in other circuits that had summarily held that
the introduction of drugs into the United States, regardless of the
origin of the drugs, constituted importation. 13
Thomas Constantine, testifying before a Congressional crime subcommittee to outline
the United States strategy to fight drugs and violent crime).
8 Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 91-1513, 84 Stat.
1285 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-971 (1994)). For further treatment of
the history and regulation of controlled substances, see Gerald T. McLaughlin, Cocaine:
The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 537, 558-73
(1973) (beginning with early prohibitions to the enactment of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970)).
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1994). For a general discussion of 21 U.S.C. § 952, see
Michael J. Gardner, Maritime Drug Smuggling Conspiracies: Criminal Liability For
Importation and Distribution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1985) (concerning the
conflicting approaches taken by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on evidence necessary to
convict a defendant of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute when the defendant was also charged with conspiracy to import a controlled
substance).
10 For the statutory definition of the term "importation," see infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
11 82 F.3d 1131 (1st Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S.
Nov. 5, 1996) (No. 96-6134).
12 See id. at 1144.
13 For a discussion of these previous cases, see infra notes 93-145 and
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Part II of this Note explores the facts and procedural history of
Ramirez-Ferrer and discusses the majority and dissenting opinions
in this case. 14  Part III examines the relevant background law,
including § 952(a) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act and past cases interpreting this statute. 5 Part IV discusses the
significance of Ramirez-Ferrer in the context of its background
law.16  Finally, Part V of this Note concludes that the First
Circuit's holding in Ramirez-Ferrer is inconsistent with other
circuit court precedent, may lead to a narrowing of the application
of § 952(a), and, therefore, may result in a less effective "war on
drugs" in the United States. 7
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In March 1993, the Police of Puerto Rico (POPR) received
information that Felipe Ramirez-Ferrer, Jorge L. Suarez-Maya,
and Raul Troche-Matos were going to purchase a quantity of
cocaine on Mona Island, Puerto Rico, and transport it by boat to
the main island of Puerto Rico.' The United States Customs
Service and the POPR tracked the boat from Mona Island back
towards Puerto Rico and apprehended the boat, with the three men
aboard, about one mile from the southwest comer of Puerto Rico. 9
After seizure, the boat was found to be carrying approximately
sixteen kilograms of cocaine. 2
Mona Island is a small island near the mainland of Puerto
Rico. This island is geographically part of the Puerto Rico
Archipelago and politically part of both the Puerto Rican
Senatorial District of Mayaguez and the municipality of Cabo
accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 18-89 and accompanying text. This Note will only focus on the
facts pertinent to the importation charge against defendants under § 952(a).
15 See infra notes 90-145 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 146-99 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
18 See United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1132 (1st Cir. 1996) (en
banc), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1996) (No. 96-6134).
19 See id. at 1133.
20 See id.
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Rico." Although Mona Island (where the cocaine was purchased
and the voyage began) is technically within the same Senatorial
District and municipality as the southwest corner of Puerto Rico
(where the boat was stopped), it is located approximately thirty-
nine miles from the main island. Because the boundaries of the
United States only extend twelve miles offshore, a vessel must
traverse approximately fifteen miles of international water in order
to travel from Mona Island to the southwest corner of Puerto
Rico.2
B. District Court
In March 1993, all three of the men aboard the boat, Ramirez-
Ferrer, Suarez-Maya, and Troche-Matos, were charged with
importing cocaine into the United States in violation of § 952(a). 4
The defendants were tried in the United States District Court of
Puerto Rico and were all found guilty by a jury verdict in
September of the same year.2
C. Court of Appeals
Initially, the First Circuit reversed the defendants' importation
26
convictions. Subsequently, however, the First Circuit agreed to
rehear the case en banc on the issue of the importation statute's
interpretation. 7
The main issue faced by the First Circuit upon rehearing was
"whether Congress intended to treat in-transit international waters
as a 'place' for purposes of [§ 952(a)] when.., both the
origination and the destination of the controlled substance
21 See id. at 1132 n. 1 (citing P.R. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, IV).
22 See id. at 1133.
23 See id.
24 See id. For a discussion of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), see infra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text. Not discussed in this Note are the charges of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute, and possession and carrying of a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking crime. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1133.
25 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1133. The jury also found the defendants guilty
of the possession and firearm charges. See id.
26 See id. This opinion has been removed from reporting services at the request of
the court. See also United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, Nos. 94-1016 to 94-1018, WL
237041 (1st Cir. Apr. 27, 1995).
27 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1133.
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occurred within United States territory."' 8 The government argued
that because the defendants traveled through international waters
with the cocaine, they brought it into the United States from a
"place outside thereof," thereby violating the importation statute.29
In response, the defendants argued that, to the contrary, they
brought the cocaine from Mona Island, a place clearly within the
United States, and, therefore, they were not guilty of "importation"
as defined by the statute.3" In deciding this issue, the court
considered the language of the statute, congressional intent,
precedent, and the historical application of this statute.3 Based
upon its analysis, the court concluded that the defendants did not
violate § 952(a) when they traversed international waters when
transporting drugs from "one part of the United States and its
customs territory (Mona Island, Puerto Rico) to another (the main
island of Puerto Rico)."32  Therefore, the court reversed the
convictions of the defendants.33
1. The Majority
The First Circuit began its analysis in Ramirez-Ferrer by
examining the language of § 952(a). The government argued that
passing over international waters en route from a domestic
origination to a domestic destination would be sufficient to
support a charge of importation under this statute.35 The court
rejected the government's argument, noting that the argument
assumed that, by focusing on the word "import" in § 952(a)
without considering the word "place," Congress intended to
address only on the result of importation, regardless of the place
28 Id. at 1136.
29 See id. at 1135.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 1135-44
32 Id.
33 See id. at 1135. The court reversed Troche-Matos' firearm conviction, but
affirmed all of the other convictions. See id. Circuit Judge Cyr concurred, but hesitated
to call the dissent's arguments "absurd." See id. at 1144 (Cyr, J., concurring). For a
discussion of Circuit Judge Boudin's dissent, which Circuit Justices Selya and Lynch
joined, see infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
34 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1135-39.
35 See id. at 1135.
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where the drugs originated.36 If this were the true interpretation of
this statute, the court believed that Congress would have simply
prohibited importation "into the United States" rather than
importation "from any place outside thereof."" Instead, the court
determined that for the purpose of § 952(a), the word "place"
should be read together with the words "from... outside" to focus
on the place of origin of the illegal controlled substances.38
The First Circuit also compared the second clause of § 952(a),
the clause at issue in this case, with the first clause of that section,
concluding that the government's interpretation of the former
could not be reconciled with a reasonable reading of the latter.39
The first clause prohibits importation into the customs territory of
the United States from any place outside the customs territory, but
within the United States, such as the Virgin Islands or Guam. °
Stating that a statute should be construed so that no part of it is
superfluous,4' the court determined that the government's
interpretation of this statute was flawed.42 If it were accepted, any
conduct conceivably addressed by clause 1 would already be
addressed by clause 2.'
The court also noted that the government's reading of clause 2
would render prosecution under clause 1 impossible.44 No one
could violate clause 1 because, in order to ship from a place within
the United States (but outside the customs territory) directly into
the customs territory of the United States, the contraband would
always be transported directly from international waters.45 Such
conduct would therefore fall within the government's
interpretation of clause 2, again rendering clause 1 useless.46
36 See id. at 1136-37.
37 See id. at 1137.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 1137-39.
40 See id. at 1137.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 1138
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
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In addition, the court commented that Congress could have
extended the conduct prohibited in clause 1 to include the conduct
of the defendants in the present case, but instead chose to restrict
clause 1 to importation into the customs territory of the United
States from a point in the United States but outside the customs
territory.47 Because Congress did not, the court concluded that in
the enactment of § 952, Congress was confronting the "classic
cases of importation-meaning international importation, not
domestic transportation, of drugs"4---and did not, therefore, intend
by § 952(a) to prohibit the activity of the defendants.49
Noting that there was no legislative history on point, the court
rejected the dissent's claim that Congress did not care about the
origin of the drugs, so long as they crossed the United States
boundary.50 The court countered that Congress could in fact have
been concerned about the origin of the drugs." Stressing the lack
of legislative history, the court declined to use what it deemed
speculative assertions of congressional intent to justify a
"strained" reading of this statute.52
Having analyzed the statutory language of § 952(a), the court
then considered previous courts' interpretations of this statute.53The court first focused on United States v. Peabody54 because it
was relied upon most heavily by the government and was the
seminal authority for other cases that followed.5 Because the
contraband in Peabody did not originate in the United States, the
Ramirez-Ferrer court concluded that any pronouncements on
contraband originating in the United States based upon Peabody
were dicta; thereby rendering "Peabody and its progeny flimsy
precedent upon which to hang one's hat. 56
47 See id. at 1139.
48Id.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 1147 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
51 See id. at 1139.
52 See id. at 1139-40.
53 See id. at 1140-41.
54 626 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980). For a more detailed discussion of Peabody, see
infr6 notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
55 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1140.
56 Id.
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Distinguishing the facts of Ramirez-Ferrer from other cases
relied upon by the government," the court found that only the
facts in United States v. Perez58 approximated those at issue in
Ramirez-Ferrer." Because the Perez court based its holding on
Peabody and its progeny without other support, the First Circuit
found that the ruling in Perez amounted to no more than "bald
assertions without analysis, 6 and, therefore, did not control the
court's decision in Ramirez-Ferrer.1
Finally, the court looked at the historical application of
§ 952(a).6 2 The court pointed to the thousands of individuals who
would be at risk of conviction under the government's
interpretation of § 952(a)-including, for example, a passenger on
a commercial whale watching vessel who happened to travel into
international waters and then re-entered domestic waters;
commercial fishermen who cross into international waters; and
leisure boaters "tacking" up the eastern coast.63  The court also
noted that, according to the government's argument, each re-entry
into the United States from international waters would be subject
to border crossing rules.4 These possibilities, the existence of
drug possession statutes addressing domestic conduct, and the lack
of previous governmental use of 952(a) in the manner advocated in
this case 65 convinced the court that the government's positions
directly conflicted with the statute's historical application.66
57 See id. at 1140-41 (discussing United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goggin,
853 F.2d 843 (11 th Cir. 1988); United States v. Doyal, 473 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Friedman, 501 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1974)). For a more detailed
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 93-147 and accompanying text.
58 776 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1985). For a more detailed discussion of Perez, see infra
notes 124-3 1.
59 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1141.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 1141-44.
63 See id. at 1142.
64 See id. at 1142-43.
65 The court noted that "[t]he government has failed to cite even one case in this
circuit.., in which a defendant was even charged... in the manner now claimed." Id.
at 1143.
See id. at 1142-43.
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The court held there cannot be a conviction for importation
under § 952(a) absent any evidence from which the jury could
infer that the drugs originated or emanated from some "place"
outside the United States. 67 Furthermore, the court noted that "the
defendant can defeat an importation charge by demonstrating
affirmatively by competent evidence that the drugs came into the
United States directly from another place... within the United
States."68  As a result, the court concluded that the undisputed
evidence in Ramirez-Ferrer showed that the drugs originated
within the United States and were transported directly to another
place within the United States.69 The First Circuit therefore
reversed the defendants' conviction for importation under
§ 952(a).7
2. The Dissent
The dissent vehemently disagreed with the majority's
reasoning in Ramirez-Ferrer, claiming that the decision conflicted
with the wording of § 952(a), uniform circuit precedent, and the
intent underlying the statute."
First, the dissent disputed the court's statutory analysis of §
952(a).7" Noting that § 952(a) prohibits importation of drugs into
the United States "from any place outside thereof," and that import
is defined for purposes of § 952(a) as "any bringing in or
introduction of such article into any area," the dissent concluded
that international waters were a "place" outside the United States.73
Because "the statute says nothing about where the defendants first
acquired their drugs, 74 and the term import is defined in relation
to destination, not origin, the dissent argued that the phrase "place
outside thereof' certainly would include international waters.75
67 See id. at 1144.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 1144-48 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
72 See id. at 1145-46 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1145 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
75 See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
1997]
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The dissent further asserted that this interpretation of the second
clause of § 952(a) would not render the first clause of that section
superfluous because of the geographic content of the first clause.
76
Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority's assertion that
Ramirez-Ferrer was distinguishable from the relevant precedent."
The dissent cited numerous decisions upholding convictions under
§ 952(a) where the drugs originated in the United States, were
taken outside of the United States, and were later returned to the
United States."8 In particular, the dissent relied upon the holdings
in United States v. Peabody,9 United States v. Goggin," and
United States v. Perez,8 all of which state explicitly that
introduction of controlled substances from international waters or
international airspace is a violation of § 952(a).82 The dissent also
referred to the case of United States v. Doya13 to emphasize that
the U.S. origin of drugs is not a defense if the drugs are
subsequently removed from the United States and then
reintroduced.84
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority's narrow
construction of the statute failed to adhere to the likely intent of
Congress. 5 Noting that the President's purpose when he proposed
this legislation was to protect the United States' borders and to
intercept drugs at their point of illegal entry into the United
States,86 the dissent concluded that Congress was likely more
76 See id. at 1146. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
77 See id. at 1146-47 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
78 See id. at 1147 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
79 626 F.2d 1300, 1301 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Had [the] cargo or contraband originated
in, say, Texas, that would not alter the fact that it was meant to reenter the United States
from international waters. That is enough.").
80 853 F.2d 843, 845 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (It is importation to bring cocaine "into the
country from international waters or airspace in excess of twelve geographical miles
outward from the coast.").
81 776 F.2d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]ransit through international waters" is
a basis for importation.).
82 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1147 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
83 437 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[E]ach time the drug was imported into the
United States a violation would occur.").
84 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1147 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 1147-48 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
86 See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting) (citing 1969 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
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concerned with interdicting illegal drugs than determining the
origin of such drugs.87 Though there was no legislative history
concerning the provisions at issue, the dissent asserted that "[t]he
legislators had no reason to care one whit whether the drugs were
brought from international waters or from a foreign land, so long
as they crossed the U.S. boundary. Indeed, Congress' indifference
to origins is reflected three times over: in its expressed purpose to
protect our 'borders,' in the expansive phrase 'from any place
outside thereof,' and in a companion statute making it unlawful for
anyone to possess prohibited drugs on board a vessel 'arriving' in
the United States .... . 88 Ultimately, the dissent concluded that
the convictions of the defendants under § 952(a) should have been
affirmed."
III. Background Law
A. Statutory Law: 21 U.S. C. § 952(a)
At the heart of the Ramirez-Ferrer decision is the First
Circuit's interpretation of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act.90 Section 952(a) of the Act provides that "[i]t shall be
unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States
from any place outside thereof (but within the United States), or to
import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any
controlled substance... or any illegal narcotic .... ."" In
Ramirez-Ferrer, it was the meaning of the term "import" that was
at issue.
Section 951(a)(1) of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act defines the term import, for the purpose of the Act, to
mean "any bringing in or introduction.., into any area (whether
or not such a bringing in or introduction constitutes an importation
within the meaning of the tariff laws of the United States)." 92 The
phrase "place outside thereof' is not, however, defined. As a
OF THE UNITED STATES 513 (1969) (Presidential message)).
87 See id. at 1148 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Boudin, J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 955 (1970)).
89 See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
90 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-971 (1994).
91 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1994).
92 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1994).
1997] 673
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result, it is unclear whether the statute is most concerned with the
"place from outside thereof' from which the drugs originated, or
the act of "introduction" into the area of the United States.
Without legislative history to guide them, courts were left to face
this issue on their own.
B. Circuit Precedent: "The Usual Suspects"93
Even without clear statutory guidance, courts have been
remarkably uniform in their interpretation of § 952(a) in cases
involving the importation of illegal drugs from international
waters and re-importation of illegal drugs originating in the United
States. Not only have other courts unanimously concluded that
importation from international waters and re-importation of drugs
of United States origin violate § 952(a); they have also failed to
discuss this issue in any depth.
1. Fifth Circuit
One of the first Fifth Circuit cases to consider the issue of re-
importation was United States v. Williams.94 The defendant in
Williams carried hashish from the United States into Mexico and
then back into the United States.95 Though the statute at issue in
96this case was a customs statute, the court nonetheless found itself
constructing the meaning of the term "import." 97 Rejecting the
defendant's argument that drugs of U.S. origin could not be
imported, the court held that "one who takes hashish out of the
country and returns with the hashish in his possession without a
declaration thereof to Customs Agents is subject to prosecution for
illegal importation" and affirmed the defendant's customs
conviction. 98
93 The majority in Ramirez-Ferrer stated that the court in United States v. Perez,
776 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1985), in its decision to uphold a conviction for importation
under § 952(a), had "merely 'rounded up the usual suspects"' in its selection of cases to
consider as precedent. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1141.
94 435 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1970).
95 See id. at 1002.
96 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1994).
97 See Williams, 435 F.2d at 1002.
98 Id. at 1002-03.
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The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Doya199 faced a similar
issue." In this case, the defendant had purchased cocaine in the
United States, transported it to Mexico and then tried to re-enter
the United States."' This case was brought under another customs
statute,"2 but the meaning of term "import" was again the main
focus of the court."3 The court rejected the defendant's claim that
cocaine acquired in the United States could subsequently be
removed from and then returned to the United States.'°4 The court
feared that if such a reading of the statute was adopted, "a person
who had previously smuggled an illegal drug into this country
without detection..., departed and then returned with the
drug,.. . could illicitly import it under the guise of it being his
Mother's tablecloth or could refuse to declare it at all and be free
of guilt."10 5 Without further analysis, the court concluded that "it
would make no difference if the drug were taken out and brought
back into the United States a number of times" because "each time
the drug was imported into the United States a violation would
occur."10 6  The court affirmed the defendant's customs
conviction. 17
In United States v. Peabody,"'8 the Fifth Circuit considered the
sufficiency of evidence needed to uphold a conviction of
conspiracy to import illegal drugs.' In this case, the defendants
were apprehended in international waters aboard a forty-foot
sailboat hauling marijuana."0 The court abruptly dismissed the
defendants' claims that the evidence was insufficient to support
the charge of intent to import, concluding that "[i]t [was] not
99 437 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1971).
100 See id. at 273.
101 See id. at 272-73.
102 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1961).
103 See Doyal, 437 F.2d at 274-75.
104 See id. at 275.
Id.
106 Id.
107Sd17See id.
108 626 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
109 See id. The court did not cite the statute upon which this conviction was based.
See id.
I10 See id. at 1300.
1997] 675
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disputed that the [defendants'] marijuana was bound for a United
States berth" because the defendants "were apprehended outside
the country, heading in..1 .Though the origin of the drugs was not
determined nor made an issue by the court, the court commented
in dicta that "had the cargo of contraband originated in, say, Texas,
[it] would not [have] alter[ed] the fact that it was meant to re-enter
the United States from international waters '12 Because the court
found the evidence to be sufficient, the defendants convictions
were affirmed."
The first case in which the Fifth Circuit specifically considered
illegal importation under § 952(a) of the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act was United States v. Phillips."4  The
defendants in that case were charged with importing marijuana
found in a house in Florida."5 Their conviction was based upon
testimony that the illegal drugs had been brought to Florida from a
"mother-ship" off the coast that had originally brought the drugs
from Columbia."6  Describing the proof required to show
importation, the court concluded that "evidence that a boat from
which marijuana was unloaded went outside United States
territorial waters or met with any other vessel that had, for
example, a 'mother ship"' was sufficient to sustain a conviction of
illegal importation under § 952(a)."7 Once again, the court upheld
the defendants' convictions."8
2. Ninth Circuit
One of the earlier Ninth Circuit decisions on illegal
importation under § 952(a) was United States v. Friedman."9 As
was the case in Williams and Doyal, the defendant in this case
crossed the border from Arizona into Mexico with cocaine and
III Id. at 1301.
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981).
[is See id. at 1033.
116 See id.
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 501 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1974).
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then later tried to re-enter the United States with the same
cocaine. 2 The defendant contested his § 952(a) conviction by
citing previous cases that had held that reintroduction of drugs of
U.S. origin into the United States did not constitute importation if
specific intent was lacking.' The court, however, distinguished
these decisions by noting that they were based on the violation of
customs laws, not § 952(a), and that for the purpose of § 952(a),
importation should be interpreted without reference to customs
law.2 2  For that reason, the court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction under § 952(a) and, therefore,
affirmed the defendant's conviction.'23
In United States v. Perez,124 the Ninth Circuit again considered
the issue of illegal importation under § 952(a).'25 The defendant in
Perez transported marijuana from the island of Rota in the
Mariana Islands to the neighboring island of Guam. 26 As did the
Friedman defendant, Perez argued against his conviction on the
basis that the drugs originated in the United States. 127 The court
cautioned that "[a]lthough Rota is part of the United States, it is
still possible that transporting drugs from Rota to Guam is a crime
under 21 U.S.C. § 952 if such transportation involves leaving the
territorial limits of the United States and then reentering."'
12
Because "all that need be proved is that the contraband cruised
international waters," the court felt that it was "necessarily
irrelevant that [the] drugs may have originated in the United
States.' 29  The court concluded that because "transit through
international waters '  was involved, the defendant therefore
violated § 952(a) and was guilty of illegal importation."'
120 See id. at 1353.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 1353-54.
123 See id. 1354.
124 776 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1985).
125 See id. at 797.
126 See id. at 800.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 801.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See id.
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4. Eleventh Circuit
In United States v. Lueck,"' the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether jury instructions describing "a place outside the United
States," for the purpose of § 952(a), include "airspace in excess of
twelve geographic miles seaward from the east coast of Florida,"
that is, include international airspace."' The defendant had flown
illegally from international waters into Florida, at night, in a small
plane134 with marijuana and methaqualone aboard.'35 The
defendant appealed from a conviction of illegal importation under
§ 952(a), claiming that the jury's instruction was overbroad."6
Because "[a]ny point outside [the] twelve mile limit of airspace
and waters constitutes 'a place outside the United States' for
purposes of proving importation under § 952(a)," the court held
that "the fact of crossing the boundary of the United States with
contraband [alone] suffices to establish importation."'37  Citing
Peabody, the court again re-iterated that "[h]ad their cargo of
contraband originated in, say, Texas, that would not alter the fact
that it was meant to re-enter the United States from international
waters."'38 As a result, it upheld the defendant's conviction for
illegal importation.39
Recalling its Lueck analysis, the Eleventh Circuit again
considered § 952(a) in United States v. Goggin.", The defendants
had flown a plane that dropped packages of cocaine onto a remote
field in Florida. 4' At issue was not the meaning of the term
"importation," but the sufficiency of the evidence showing that the
defendants' plane had in fact been over international airspace to
support a conviction under § 952(a).' 42 The court re-iterated, as a
132 678 F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1982).
133 Id. at 904-05.
134 See id. at 896-98.
135 See id. at 898.
136 See id. at 905.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See id.
140 853 F.2d 843 (11 th Cir. 1988).
141 See id. at 844.
142 See id. at 844-46.
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preliminary matter, that "the government need not demonstrate a
specific point on foreign soil from which the cocaine originated to
establish a violation of § 952(a)."' 43  Instead, to prove illegal
importation, the court required only a "showing that the defendant
brought cocaine into the country from international waters or
airspace.. .. "44 After reviewing the evidence presented in this
case, the court upheld the defendants' conviction under § 952(a).
45
IV. Analysis
The majority in Ramirez-Ferrer hinged its statutory
interpretation of § 952(a) on the plain meaning of the word
"place."' 46  As a result, the majority determined that merely
passing over international waters en route from a domestic point of
origin to a domestic destination did not constitute "importation.
' 47
The majority rejected the government's and the dissent's
contention that the plain meaning of the statue, congressional
intent, and precedent were not concerned with the point of origin
of the drugs, so long as a showing could be made that they had
entered the United States from a point outside.
1 48
A. The Statute
By determining that the plain meaning of the word "place"
required proof that the illegal drugs originated from foreign soil,
the majority disregarded the fact that Congress defined "import" as
"any bringing in or introduction of."' 49 The majority also failed to
resolve the statute's silence on a required showing of a place of
origin, although the statute does state a specific destination-the
United States.' Nor does the majority address the statutory
definition of United States, which in pertinent part is "all places
143 Id. at 845.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 845-46.
146 See United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1137 (1st Cir. 1996) (en
banc), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1996) (No. 96-6134).
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1994).
150 See 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1994).
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and waters.., subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' 5'
The majority also stated that a valid reason for accepting an
interpretation of a statute is the reasonableness of the result, in
contrast to the unreasonable results reached by alternative readings
of the statute.' The majority claimed that if the government's
interpretation was accepted, any shipment into the United States
traversing international waters or airspace would violate the
second clause of § 952(a).'53 As a result, the first clause of
§ 952(a) would be rendered superfluous. 54 The majority believed
this was both an unreasonable and improper result under standard
statutory interpretation.
55
In addition, courts have held that the purpose of § 952(a) is to
eliminate the trafficking of controlled substances and narcotics in
the United States by restricting importation.'56 It should, therefore,
"make no difference if the drugs were taken out and brought back
into the United States, even if done a number of times; each time
the drugs were [transported back] into the United States a violation
of the statute [should] occur.'' 57
B. The Precedent
The majority's approach was also inconsistent with the
precedent applying § 952(a). The Ramirez-Ferrer court was
critical of the precedent from other circuits, finding it to be
without support, inapposite, or merely dicta.' The court
dismissed the language in several cases as dicta." 9 Primarily, the
court asserted that reliance on Peabody60 would be "particularly
flawed"' 6' because the Peabody court was not concerned with the
151 21 U.S.C. § 802(28) (1994).
152 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1143 (quoting United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d
516 (lst Cir. 1985)).
153 See id. at 1137.
154 See id. at 1138.
155 See id. at 1137.
156 United States v. Doyal, 437 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1971).
157IdId.
158 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1140-41.
159 See id. at 1140.
160 United States v. Peabody, 626 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
161 Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.2d at 1140.
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origin of the controlled substances. 6 2 Furthermore, the majority
distinguished Ramirez-Ferrer from Phillips.'63 In Phillips, the
drugs seized were brought directly from Columbia through
"mother ships" off the Florida coast.164 The Ramirez-Ferrer court
concluded that these decisions had not addressed the same issue as
the court was confronted with in Ramirez-Ferrer.
65
Moreover, the majority found the circumstances and evidence
in several other cases to be distinguishable from those in Ramirez-
Ferrer.'" The court found critical the evidence in Lueck167 and
Goggin' that the defendants were spotted and tracked while
flying an aircraft from over the Bahamas (international airspace)
into domestic airspace.169 In contrast, the court pointed to the
evidence in Ramirez-Ferrer that showed the drugs originated from
within the United States. 7  In considering the Doyal.'and
Friedman"' cases, the Ramirez-Ferrer court found significant the
fact that the defendants were apprehended while transporting the
drugs into the United States from foreign soil, rather than merely
traversing international waters as in Ramirez-Ferrer. The court
believed that under the facts of those cases a finding in Ramirez-
Ferrer of importation was justified.'73
The court did acknowledge that Perez' squarely held that
transit through international waters was sufficient to sustain an
importation charge under § 952(a)."' In Perez, the defendant
162 See Peabody, 626 F.2d at 1300-01.
163 United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981).
164 Id. at 1033.
165 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1140.
166 See id.
167 United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895 (1 1th Cir. 1982), reh 'g denied, 695 F.2d
566 (11 th Cir. 1982).
168 United States v. Goggin, 853 F.2d 843 (11 th Cir. 1988)).
169 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1140.
170 See id.
171 United States v. Doyal, 437 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1971).
172 United States v. Friedman, 501 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1054 (1974).
173 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1136 n.3, 1140.
174 United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1985).
175 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1140.
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transported drugs from the island of Rota in the Mariana Islands to
Guam, traversing international waters between the two7 6 The
court noted a difference between Perez and Ramirez-Ferrer,
namely that in Ramirez-Ferrer the place of origin and of
destination were within the same jurisdiction and municipality.'77
The majority, however, did not feel these circumstances existed in
Perez.7  In addition, the court noted the factual similarities
between Ramirez-Ferrer and the Ninth Circuit's holding in Perez,
but was not convinced the result in Perez was correct.'79 The
Ramirez-Ferrer court was critical of the Ninth Circuit's lack of
reasoning and, therefore, was unpersuaded as to the significance of
the Perez decision, despite the factual resemblance. 8 '
Although the precedent does not offer an in-depth analysis
justifying the application of § 952 in circumstances analogous to
those in Ramirez-Ferrer, it offers a more certain outcome. The
precedent does not require the court to perform mental acrobatics
in determining the actual origin of the drugs. Instead, it focuses
only on the entry into the United States from some "place outside
thereof."
As a result, the dissent's reliance on precedent is well-founded.
Circuit precedent cited in Ramirez-Ferrer arguably supports a
violation of § 952(a) under the circumstances in Ramirez-Ferrer.
Although this precedent was not controlling authority for the First
Circuit, the majority in Ramirez-Ferrer took liberties in applying
its own reasoning, thereby creating a conflict in interpretation
where there was none before. The Ramirez-Ferrer court found it
"difficult to accept that Congress intended the government's
reading of § 952(a), considering that this reading of the statute has
somehow lain lifeless for 25 years ....""'
The dissent's attempt to counter the majority's analysis of
§ 952(a), however, was not entirely convincing. While the dissent
relied on several cases to justify that international waters is a
176 See Perez, 776 F.2d at 797.
177 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 52 F.3d at 1141 n. 10.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 1141.
180 See id. at 1140.
181 Id. at i141.
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"place" under § 952(a), 82 its illustration of an appropriate
application of clause 1 did not square with the precedent's reliance
on § 952(a). The precedent's application of § 952(a) focused on
the fact that the vessel or aircraft entered domestic territory from a
place outside thereof, not concerning itself with the departure
point of the vessel or aircraft."3  The dissent's example of
prohibited conduct under clause 1 referred to a defendant who
transported drugs through international airspace from a United
States possession to a United States customs territory.'" The
dissent, however, and counter to their own argument, questioned
whether a non-stop flight between two United States points could
ever be treated as importation.'85
Although the geographic content in the first clause allows the
example to effectively demonstrate that the first clause is not
superfluous,'86 both the majority and the dissent create unexplained
distinctions. The conflict arose because the dissent (and the
precedent) explicitly relied on the language within the second
clause of § 952(a) to prohibit the transportation of drugs through
international waters. In its example, however, the dissent implied
a difference between the two flights. 7 The reasoning of the
majority and that of the dissent seem to create more ambiguity in
the application of the statute than they resolve. 88
C. The Results
Even though the dissent's interpretation of § 952(a) is not
entirely satisfying, the majority's reading of this statute may lead
to undesirable and counterintuitive results. The majority draws a
182 See id. at 1146-1147 (Boudin, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lueck, 678
F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goggin, 853 F.2d 843 (11 th Cir. 1988)).
183 See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 501 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1054 (1974); United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1982).
184 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1146 (Boudin, J., dissenting).
185 See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
186 See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
187 See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
188 Even the majority agreed with the dissent, that if a day hiker happened to cross
the border into Canada and back into the United States, while carrying drugs, she would
be in violation of the statute. See id. at 1136. The majority stated this "obviously would
be entering U.S. territory from a 'place outside thereof."' Id. at 1136 n.3.
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narrow distinction between the actual facts of Ramirez-Ferrer and
what could have happened to constitute importation under
§ 952(a). 89 The court determined that while a shipment of drugs
merely traversing international waters was insufficient to
constitute importation, if the defendants' had carried the drugs
from Mona Island into another sovereign nation and then into
Puerto Rico, a violation would have been found.'9
The majority seemed to imply that if the defendants had
merely stopped to refuel their vessel in a foreign port it would
suddenly transform the journey from mere transportation into
importation. It is unlikely that Congress contemplated such an
inconsistent application of the statute. Moreover, this undermines
the majority's response to the government's contention that by
focusing on the origin of the drugs, too great a burden will be
placed on the prosecution in the case. The majority reasoned that
when the origin of the drugs is unknown, then the origin can be
presumed to be from a place outside the United States.' 9' In the
case of stopping in a foreign port, the drugs could therefore be
known to have originated in a domestic territory, but by a mere
happenstance of entering foreign "soil" the origin becomes
insignificant in determining the result of prosecution. This would
be within the grasp of Congressional intent no more than arresting
the everyday fisherman who travels beyond the twelve mile point
at sea and returns, all-the-while possessing drugs for personal
(although no less illegal) use.
The Ramirez-Ferrer court also stated that the government's
approach under § 952(a) would lead to "ludicrous" results., It is
the majority, however, who trivialized the issue by framing
inappropriate hypothetical situations against the background of the
government's and the dissent's interpretation of § 952(a)."' As the
dissent pointed out, the government had not "abused the statute by
189 See id. at 1136.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 Id. at 1142.
193 See, e.g., id. ("A maritime worker traveling to and from an oil rig on
international waters in the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana, or on George's Bank off New
England, would be... exposed" to importation charges if he had drugs in his
possession.").
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applying it to trivial amounts for personal use .... ,, The
majority's distinction serves no purpose in the effective
application of the statute, further complicating the government's
effort. to prosecute criminals, resulting in judicial inefficiency and
wasted resources.
In fact, the court's holding raises serious questions as to how
§ 952 should be enforced in the future. First, why would it be
importation if an individual merely stepped foot on foreign soil
(even accidentally) and reentered the United States with the same
drugs he had before leaving, but it not be importation if the same
individual departed United States waters to later re-enter them
from international waters? 95 The result reached by the majority
places the focus of the statute--and therefore that of the
prosecutors and courts applying it-on the origin of the drugs by
distinguishing between soil and water. As such, an individual
would likely be in violation of the majority's reading of § 952 if
she carried drugs from Alaska, across land through Canada, and
into the United States. The same individual would not, however,
be subject to § 952 if she transported the same drugs by boat from
Alaska into the United States (even assuming she crossed through
international waters to do so).
Second, how, in the eyes of the dissent, is it importation for a
boat to cross international waters in a non-stop shipment of drugs
between two United States points (i.e. Florida to Texas), but it is
questionable whether a non-stop flight between the same two
United States points would be? The conflict created here may
easily be resolved by the wary drug trafficker: she will merely
transport her shipments via the airways in the future.
Third, how can the majority justify a presumption of
importation when the origin of the drug shipment is unknown, or
194 Id. at 1148 (Boudin, J., dissenting). The dissent highlighted that § 952(a) has
only been applied in cases of "major drug shipments arriving from international waters
or international airspace." Id. (Boudin, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent stated
that it has been upheld in every reported case. See id. (Boudin, J., dissenting).
195 The majority stated, "we are not faced with a factual situation in which a
defendant leaves United States domestic territory empty-handed, proceeds to
international waters or to a foreign territory to acquire contraband there, and then returns
to domestic territory with this contraband." Id. Under such circumstances, the
government's interpretation of international waters as a "place" from which the drugs
are imported becomes more convincing. See id.
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transform a transportation of drugs into importation by the mere
happenstance of coming into contact with foreign soil, while
insisting that transportation over international sea or air routes (in
many cases the only method of entering the United States) is not
importation? Under this result, a potential for circumventing the
statutory prohibition arises where no loopholes existed. Namely,
now the shrewd smuggler can alter her transit routes and increase
the number of hand-offs to other carriers to render a finding of
origin impossible and, thereby, avoid importation charges. 196 After
all, it was the majority who gave the defendant the power to defeat
an importation charge by affirmatively demonstrating the drugs
came from within the United States. 1
97
It was also the majority who stated that if an unreasonable
result is reached by an alternative reading of a statute, that
interpretation should be rejected in favor of a more reasonable
result.' 98  Unlike the precedent, the court in Ramirez-Ferrer
applied reasoning that lead to further uncertainty; therefore, is it an
unreasonable result that should be avoided for a more reasonable
one? If so, does the precedent's consistent application of § 952(a)
lead to a decisive and easily calculable result that should be
universally adopted? 9
V. Conclusion
Although the majority in Ramirez-Ferrer laid out extensive
reasoning with detailed statutory interpretation, the court's
interpretation of the statute does not account for the result reached
by precedent, nor the intent (implied or otherwise) of Congress.
196 See Michael J. Gardner, Maritime Drug Smuggling Conspiracies: Criminal
Liability for Importation and Distribution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 217 (1985).
"Because drug smuggling organizations respond to changes in the law that minimize the
risk of conviction, the [different interpretation reached by the First Circuit court in
Ramirez-Ferrer] may encourage smugglers to ply their trade in the area where the risks
are less severe." Id. at 218-219.
197 See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1144.
198 See id. at 1143 (quoting United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1985)).
199 The recent denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court would appear
to be a missed opportunity to answer this question. See Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131
(1st Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1996) (No. 96-
6134). It may now be up to Congress to resolve this issue through an amendment and
further clarification of their intent.
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By its mechanical dismissal of the precedent as dicta or without
reasoning, the court gives no consideration to the fact that four
other circuits have interpreted § 952(a) to apply under analogous
circumstances as those before the First Circuit in Ramirez-Ferrer.
Finally, the majority in Ramirez-Ferrer based its decision partially
on the lack of legislative history and historical application (as they
interpreted it) of § 952, despite precedent that would clearly have
justified an opposite finding.
One of the most effective ways the government can respond to
drug trafficking is through severe penalties. Although the
penalties for illegal importation of drugs under § 952(a) are the
same as those for a conviction of possession with intent to
distribute illegal drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),"'0 consecutive
sentences can still be imposed."' As a result, a conviction for
importation of controlled substances can carry a much stiffer
penalty when combined with a conviction for possession with
intent to distribute. Broadly construed, § 952(a) could, therefore,
help to slow the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
In order to provide a clearer and more consistent approach for
determining the applicability of § 952(a) in factual scenarios like
that of Ramirez-Ferrer, Congress should amend the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act to provide a more precise
definition of importation. Otherwise, the First Circuit's decision
in Ramirez-Ferrer may lead to an unnecessarily narrow
interpretation of § 952(a). Such a result could ultimately put out
of commission an effective weapon in the United States "war on
drugs."
WAYNE K. MAIORANO
200 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (1994) (describing the penalties for violations of
§ 952) with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994) (describing the penalties for violations of
§'841(a)).
201 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (upholding defendants'
consecutive sentences for convictions of conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy
to distribute marijuana); see also United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651 (1st Cir.
1990) (holding conviction and sentencing for both importation of drugs and possession
with intent to distribute does not violate double jeopardy clause because the crimes are
distinct and require different proof for conviction), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 926 (1991);
United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding consecutive
sentences for importation of drugs and possession of drugs with intent to distribute was
within discretion of trial judge and properly imposed).
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